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Abstract
We show how the occurrence of a civil war has heterogeneous effects on the level
of GDP, using case-study, synthetic control and large-N panel-data approaches.
We first discuss the relation between these methods and then provide lower and
upper estimates of the economic effect of civil war. Although, on average, the
incidence of internal conflicts has a negative effect on the GDP level, it is very often
insignificant. More importantly, however, both methods display a wide variety of
individual separate effects, and in a large number of countries civil war has either
no effect or a positive and significant impact on the prospect for economic growth.
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21 Introduction
Civil wars are the dominant form of violence in the contemporary international system.
From 1960 to 2010, more than 20% of nations experienced at least ten years of civil war.
The number of active conflicts peaked in the 1980s and 1990s, following the collapse of
the Soviet Union and the outbreak of conflict across Sub-Saharan Africa, where a third of
countries had active civil wars during the mid-1990s. Civil war is more frequent in poor
countries and can further weaken their prospects for economic development. An extensive
literature has investigated the effects of civil war on economic growth across countries.
Surveys on the economic costs of conflict are provided by Gardeazabal (2010), Skaperdas
(2011), World Bank (2011), Bru¨ck and De Groot (2013), De Groot et al. (2012) and Smith
(2014).
We contribute to a very active area of academic debate in recent years by showing how
civil wars have heterogenous, country-specific effects on economic performances. Most of
the economic studies on civil war are all-country all-year estimations, which conceal the
high degree of heterogeneity in countries’ response to conflict shocks. In fact, on the
one hand, civil wars can cause economic catastrophes, as in Uganda during the military
dictatorship of Idi Amin from 1971-79, when up to half a million people were killed and
the per capita GDP declined by 40% within one decade. On the other hand, however,
civil wars are not identical, and the category encompasses different circumstances and
realities; in fact the number of battle deaths in many civil war countries is comparable to
the number of homicides in stable and prosperous economies, like Russia or South Africa
(Cramer, 2006). Social welfare can even improve in the absence of a central state when
the government is exploitative and oppressive (see Powell et al., 2008), thus challenging
the very notion of a negative impact.
We focus on 27 case studies to identify particular responses that are averaged out
in large-N quantitative studies, where conflict is assumed to produce the same outcome
in very different economies. We use a counterfactual approach - the synthetic control
method - and compare the post-conflict GDP trajectories of conflict-ridden countries
3with the trajectories of combinations of otherwise similar but unexposed countries. A
common critique of the cross-country literature is the presence of unmeasurable time
varying omitted variables, such as the quality of the institutions, that affect both economic
growth and the likelihood of war. This method mitigates the bias by accommodating for
unobservable confounders. We also examine the relationship between the case-study,
synthetic control and large-N panel-data approaches and provide a range of estimates of
the effect of civil war. In particular, we show that both models estimated from panel data
and models where treatment effects are estimated by comparison of a treated case with a
synthetic control can reveal a great degree of heterogeneity in the economic effect of civil
war. In a number of cases, countries actually perform better in the presence of conflict,
relative to previous periods of peace.
Our case-study analysis shows that, on average, civil war reduces the GDP level by
9.1%. Yet this approach also reveals a great degree of heterogeneity in the way economies
react to conflicts: we find that only 12 of the 27 cases show a significant negative effect of
war on the GDP level. When we turn to the panel data analysis, we find that estimated
impact of conflict on the GDP level is overall insignificant. However, the point estimates
obscure the wide range of possible responses to conflict; in fact, by relaxing the homo-
geneity restrictions in the panel analysis, we find that individual separate effects of civil
war for each country range from -33% to +32% of the GDP.1
The remainder of our paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a short review
of the theoretical arguments and empirical studies on the economic costs of war, including
the methodological issues involved in the calculation. Section 3 discusses the relationship
between panel and synthetic control estimators. Section 4 describes the synthetic control
method and presents the implemented experiments by region. Section 5 presents the
results of the panel data analyses. Section 6 provides concluding remarks.
1Our results are very sensitive to the choice of the dependent variable, level or growth of GDP, as
shown in Bove et al. (2014).
42 The economic costs of war
War devastates lives, health, and living standards both directly in the form of battle
deaths, and indirectly through increased rates of diseases. At the same time, war could
destroy obsolete physical infrastructure and some of the social and political institutions
that inhibited development in the first place (Van Raemdonck and Diehi, 1989; Blattman
and Miguel, 2010). In fact, a number of theoretical studies suggest that war can have
both positive and negative impacts on subsequent economic growth, through a variety
of channels. Theories on the positive effect of war hinge crucially on the existence of
improvements resulting from war participation, in particular institutional changes and
technological innovations. Tilly (1992) argues that, starting from 990 AD, major mobi-
lizations for war stimulated states’ expansion and consolidation, and created new forms
of political organization. Likewise, Cramer (2006) recalls how changing technological de-
mands for warfare in Europe in the 19th century forced states to find new funding sources.
In a shift from small mercenary forces to larger domestic military forces, European states
had to create taxation institutions to mobilise war finances. Wars were followed by a
successful transformation of failed states, and the most successful states had a growing
tax base, such as England and Prussia. In fact, “much of the institutional apparatus of
modern government and economic management has its origin in the compulsion to finance
wars” (Cramer, 2006, p.178).
Seminal empirical studies by Organski and Kugler (1977) and Organski (1981) analyze
the economic effects of WWI and WWII on European Countries. The authors suggest
that winners and neutrals are only affected marginally by the conflict and that developed
societies devastated by war recovered in one generation the levels of performance they
would have had in the absence of conflict. This phenomenon is called the “Phoenix
Factor” and underpins two key factors: obsolescent plants and industrial equipment are
replaced by more advanced and efficient infrastructures; at the same time, attitudinal
factors, in particular the motivation to rebuild and the greater effort exerted by a defeated
population, increase the pace of recovery. Taken together, these mechanisms can lead to
5greater post-war productivity.
Another popular argument for the existence of a positive post-war economic trajectory
is offered by Olson (1982). He argues that rent-seeking activities by special interest groups
hamper economic growth. These so-called distributional coalitions resist the adoption of
new technologies and a more efficient allocation of production factors, thus undermining
capital formation and slowing economic development. Civil wars destroy the existing
social order and weaken or uproot special interests that block socio-economic changes,
and thus contribute to liberating a country’s productive resources and improving the
level of welfare provision. Chan (1987), among others, explores the experience of the
Asian Pacific-rim countries and find support for this mechanism.
A related argument posits that after war less predatory political regime could emerge.
Most of the civil wars usually breaks out in countries with dysfunctional states that are
not only unable to provide basic public goods, such as infrastructures and schools, but
may themselves be a major hurdle to economic development. Oppressive and exploitative
governments can in fact depress economic development below a level achievable without
any government at all. Leeson (2007) and Powell et al. (2008) compare Somalia’s relative
economic performance when the country had a government with its extended period of
post-1991 war and anarchy. They both find that a number of Somalia’s development indi-
cators have improved during its period of statelessness. The results are explained by the
existence of public corruption and government rent-seeking in the pre-war period. The
emergence of anarchy opened up opportunities for advancement not possible before the
collapse of the state. Therefore, when a good government is not an option in a country’s
institutional opportunity set, anarchy could be more desirable for its economic develop-
ment (Leeson, 2007). Van Raemdonck and Diehi (1989) review additional theoretical
arguments on the positive effects of war on economic growth. They suggest that war
can i) enhance government research and development efforts that spawn spinoffs for the
economy; ii) encourage the exploration of new resources or raw material; iii) prompt bet-
ter transportation and communication facilities that yield benefits after the war is over;
6iv) improve managerial and organisational skills; and v) redirect resources to peacetime
industries that were ignored during the war. Finally, using an integrated economic model
which accounts for multiple forms of conflict, a recent work by de Groot et al. (2015) finds
that whereas developing countries lost as a result of conflict, developed countries seemed
to benefit from it.
Yet, as Van Raemdonck and Diehi (1989) point out, the theoretical arguments for why
wars have negative economic effects are inverted versions of the previous mechanisms. War
destroys transportation facilities and productive human capital, including economic skills,
while large-scale killings create demographic distortions and military demobilisation leads
to labor surplus. Other economic distortion stems from the servicing of debts, the lack
of investments, higher levels of military spending for deterrence, and the disruption of
international economic linkages, such as trade (see Smith, 2014, for an overview).
Collier (1999), possibly the most cited article on the cost of civil wars, finds that during
civil wars GDP per capita declines at an annual rate of 2.2%. The decline is partly because
war directly reduces production and partly because it causes a loss of the capital stock due
to destruction, dissaving, and portfolio substitution of foreign investors. Blomberg et al.
(2004) use a structural VAR model to show that negative shocks to GDP due to internal
or external conflicts yield much larger and longer-lived effects than those obtained from
a negative shock due to terrorism. Using an event-study methodology, Chen et al. (2008)
analyze a cross-section of 41 countries and find a substantial drop in per capita income
in conflict countries during war and a failure to make subsequent progress in key areas
of social and political development comparable to countries that did not experience civil
war. A number of articles also investigate the spillover effects on neighbouring countries
and trading partners (e.g. Murdoch and Sandler, 2002; Fosu, 2003; Kang and Meernik,
2005; Butkiewicz and Yanikkaya, 2005; Koubi, 2005; De Groot, 2010).
There are several methodological difficulties involved in quantifying the economic costs
of conflict, reviewed in Smith (2014). Cerra and Saxena (2008) use impulse response
functions and show that the immediate effect of a civil war induce a reduction of 6%
7points in GDP, although almost half of that loss is recovered after about 6 years.2 Yet,
the long-run estimates are imprecise and allow for the possibility of a zero long-run effect.
Moreover, in the event of a long civil war, such as in Angola or Sri Lanka, the negative
effects on growth can be expected to compound over time and it is not clear to what
extent output can be expected to partially recover in the long run, as it does in the
impulse response to a theoretical one-time shock (see also Skaperdas, 2011). Another
methodological issue hinges on the coding procedure: Cerra and Saxena (2008) use a
dummy variable that takes on the value 1 in all civil war-years (as opposed to the start
years when they analyse other shocks such as banking crisis). Mueller (2012) shows how
this leads to an underestimation of the output response to civil war, which ends up being
the most devastating type of crisis.
Country experiences in terms of growth of course vary widely and aggregate studies
conceal a deal of heterogeneity in countries’ response to conflict. A small body of recent
works compare outcomes between neighboring areas within the same country with differ-
ent exposure to conflict, using micro level data (Davis et al., 2002; Miguel and Roland,
2011; Brakman et al., 2004; Lopez and Wodon, 2005). Yet these works are case studies and
Abadie et al. (2015) note that a widespread consensus has emerged about the necessity of
building bridges between the quantitative and qualitative approaches to research in social
science. Both case studies and large N studies are done for a variety of different purposes,
but one purpose is to measure the effect on some focus variable, an outcome of interest,
of some event or intervention. The intervention is often referred to as a ‘treatment’ by
analogy with the microeconometric program evaluation literature. In the study of the
economic effect of war a central issue is the definition of the counterfactual, what would
have happened in the absence of the conflict, something which can never be observed.
The synthetic control method is a well established technique used in Abadie and
Gardeazabal (2003) to estimate the economic cost of the Basque conflict, and has gained
increased popularity recently through the availability of the package Synth available on
2Similarly, Auray et al. (2014) study the impact of conflicts on macroeconomic aggregates, including
GDP, of 9 countries from 1870 onwards.
8MATLAB, R and Stata. This method compares the post event trajectory for the variable
of interest with a weighted average of the values of that variable from a comparison group
chosen on the basis of their pre-treatment similarity to the treated unit. Others have
used it to examine a diversity of cases, such as Abadie et al. (2010) who examine the
effect of California’s smoking control program, Billmeier and Nannicini (2013) who look
at the impact of economic liberalisation, or the study of Costalli et al. (2014), developed
independently from ours, which examine the economic effects of civil war on 20 countries,
the case we are concerned with.3 There is an alternative, panel time-series based approach
introduced by Hsiao et al. (2012), which can be used to provide a counterfactual. Although
this approach seems to have been less widely used, it has a number of attractive features.
In the following section we discuss the relationship between the synthetic control
and panel approaches and suggest a method, based primarily on a Chow test, to assess
the significance of the measured synthetic control effects. We then compare panel and
synthetic control estimates of the economic cost of civil war.
3 Synthetic control method and panel model
The synthetic control approach arises from the microeconometric literature where it
is natural to try and measure the treatment effect by comparing the treated cases with
untreated controls who are similar in all respect but treatment. The approach fits less well
in a time series context where as Abadie et al. (2015) note the use of statistical inference
is difficult because of the small sample nature of the data, the absence of randomization,
and the fact that probabilistic sampling is not employed to select sample units. Thus
rather than giving confidence intervals for their estimates Abadie et al. (2015) use what
they term placebo studies. Abadie et al. (2010) motivate the approach with a factor
model.
There is a separate approach to measuring the treatment effect used by Hsiao et al.
3Another study is from Gardeazabal and Vega-Bayo (2015), on the effect of conflicts on real GDP per
capita and investments, which appeared after the working paper version of this paper was circulated.
9(2012), which arises from the panel time-series literature. This also uses a factor model but
in a quite different way. Hsiao et al ’s (2012) remark 9 discusses the relationship between
the synthetic control and panel factor representations. Where Abadie et al. (2015) ask
what was the economic impact on West Germany of the 1990 German reunification?,
Hsiao et al. (2012) ask what was the economic impact on Hong Kong of the political and
economic integration with China? Hsiao et al. (2012) exploit the cross-section dependence
across units, countries in this case, to construct the counterfactuals. The dependence is
attributed to strong factors that drive all units, though their effect on each unit may be
different. This procedure allows them to estimate standard errors for the treatment effect
and they find that political integration after 1997 had hardly any impact on Hong Kong
growth, but economic integration did have a significant effect and raised Hong-Kong’s
annual real GDP by about 4%. The importance of allowing for cross-section dependence
when measuring effects in panels is emphasized by Gaibulloev et al. (2014) who examine
the impact of terrorism on growth.
Gobillon and Magnac (2016) also compare panel models (the closely related interac-
tive fixed effects model), difference-in-differences and synthetic control. They show that
difference-in-differences is generically biased when different units respond differently to
the factors and derive the support conditions that are required for the application of
synthetic controls. This literature which considers the difference between the treatment
group and a control to measure the effect of the treatment uses static models. If a lagged
dependent variable were included it would embody the effect of conflict in the previous
year treatment, reducing the effect of conflict. The conflict itself is likely to change the
degree of persistence of GDP further complicating the analysis. For comparability with
the other literature and to aid interpretation we also use static models. The appropriate
way to handle dynamics and parameter change in this context are discussed in Pesaran
and Smith (2016).
The synthetic control method is described in more detail in Abadie et al. (2010, 2015),
but suppose that we have a sample of i = 1, 2, ..., N units, in time periods t = 1, 2, ..., T
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with focus variable yit. The target, unit 1, is subject to the intervention at time T0, with
post intervention data t = T0 + 1, T0 + 2, ..., T0 + T1, with T = T0 + T1. The other N − 1
control or “donor” units are not subject to the intervention and are not affected by the
consequences of the intervention in unit 1. The effect of the intervention is measured as
d1,T0+h = y1,T0+h −
N∑
i=2
wiyi,T0+h; h = 1, 2, ..., T1. (1)
To determine the weights wi let x1kt be a set of k = 1, 2, ..., K predictor variables
for y1t, with the corresponding variables in the other units given by xjkt, j = 2, 3, ..., N.
These variables are averaged over the pre-intervention period to get xT01k and X
T0
k the
N−1×1 vector of predictor k in the control group.4 Then the N−1×1 vector of weights
W = (w2, w3, ..., wN)
′ are chosen to minimize
K∑
k=1
vk(x
T0
1k −W ′X
T0
k )
2
subject to
∑N
i=2wi = 1, wi ≥ 0,where vk is a weight that reflects the relative impor-
tance of variable k. The vk are often chosen by cross-validation, which may be problematic
for potentially non-stationary time-series samples. The focus variable may be included in
xikt. Abadie et al. (2010) prove (subject to condition) that matching on pre-intervention
outcomes helps control for the unobserved factors affecting the outcome of interest. This
chooses the comparison units to be as similar as possible to the target along the dimen-
sions included in xikt.. In the case of German reunification in Abadie et al. (2015) the
comparison group is Austria, 0.42, US, 0.22, Japan 0.16, Switzerland 0.11 and Nether-
lands, 0.09. The synthetic West Germany is similar to the real West Germany in pre 1990
pre capita GDP, trade openness, schooling, investment rate and industry share. As they
note there may be spillover effects. Since Austria, Switzerland and Netherlands share
borders with Germany there is a possibility that their post 1990 values may be influenced
4The predictor variables can be formed from the average of all the available pre-intervention periods,
the average of a shorter pre-intervention sub-sample or using particular years. The choice of predictor
variables is not uncontroversial and Kaul et al. (2015) argue against the use of pre-intervention outcomes.
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by German reunification.
Hsiao et al. (2012) measure the effect in the same way using (1), but choose the wi
by regression of y1t, growth in Hong Kong on a subset of yjt, j = 2, 3, ..., N, growth
in the control countries during the pre-intervention period. The subset is chosen by a
model selection procedure. The control group they select contains Japan, Korea, USA,
Philippines and Taiwan. They emphasize that Hong Kong is too small for the effects of
integration with China to influence any of these countries. There are positive weights on
USA and Taiwan and negative weights on the other three. Abadie et al. (2015) criticize
regression methods because they can give negative weights, but the object of the two
exercises is different. The Abadie et al ’s (2014) procedure is designed to build a synthetic
control which is very similar to the target. This is sensible in a microeconometric context
when the units are only subject to weak factors. The Hsiao et al. (2012) procedure
is designed to construct a good prediction of the focus variable in the target taking
advantage of the strong factors present in macro-economic time-series. This is sensible in
a macroeconometric context, because very different countries can be driven by the same
common trends. Hsiao et al. (2012) include the US in the controls, not because the US
is like Hong Kong, but because US growth is a good predictor of Hong Kong growth. No
other country is like Hong Kong, not even Singapore, the closest comparison. Hong Kong
lies outside the support of the data for the other countries, which raises a problem for
the synthetic control method, which relies on finding an average that is similar, but not
for the prediction method. Note that the fact that regression methods can give negative
weights comes as no surprise if one interprets the procedure as involving prediction using
global factors. Suppose Hong Kong before integration is largely driven by global factor
A, the US by factors A and B, and Japan largely by factor B; then the US minus Japan
provides an estimate of factor A, which drives Hong Kong.
Following Abadie et al. (2010, p.495) we can write the model in (1)
yit = ditcit + y
N
it
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where yNit is the estimated value in the absence of intervention and cit = 1 if i = 1 and
t > T0, zero otherwise. Were we to then model y
N
it by a country specific intercept and
global factors, ft plus an idiosyncratic error, we would obtain
yit = ditcit + αi + λ
′
ift + εit (2)
which is a standard heterogeneous factor augmented panel model. There are a variety
of ways of estimating the unobserved factors, ft. Conditional on estimates of the factors,
the dit can be obtained as the prediction errors from estimates of (2) for each country
up to T0. The significance of the dit can then be estimated by the usual Chow predictive
failure test. We can allow for more countries to be subject to intervention, by defining
cit = 1, if a civil war is in progress and cit = 0 if not.
In their study of terrorism using a model like (2) Gaibulloev et al. (2014) use a mod-
ified projected principal component estimator. Another estimator is the Pesaran (2006)
correlated common effect estimator which proxies the unobserved ft by the cross section
averages (weighted or unweighted) of the observed variables. This involves estimating
yit = ditcit + αi + δ1ict+δ2iyt + εit (3)
This brings out the similarities to the synthetic control and Hsiao et al. (2012) ap-
proaches, where the cross-section averages are used to provide the predicted counterfac-
tual. Where it differs is that ct, the average prevalence of conflict is included, which allows
for contagion effects. The averages may be weighted or unweighted, and if weighted may
give zero weights to some countries like the synthetic control.
If we assume homogeneity of λ
′
i in (2) we get
yit = ditcit + αi + αt + εit
with αt = λ
′
ft. This is a two way fixed effect model, a static version of equation (1) of
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Gaibulloev et al. (2014).5
If we further assume that the effects of conflict are homogeneous over time and country
so that dit = β, we have a standard panel model of the cost of conflict
yit = βcit + αi + αt + εit
In our example, which we discuss in more detail below, we will consider a balanced
panel i = 1, 2, ..., N and t = 1, 2, ..., T with data for yit which is the log per-capita real
GDP and cit = 1 if a civil war is taking place in country i in year t and cit = 0 otherwise.
The sample is made up of those that had civil wars (but not other sorts of wars) and
those that had no wars at all.6 There is an issue about whether other covariates should
be included, since the civil war may have effects on these other variables and attributing
this effect to variations in the other covariates may ‘over-control’ and under-estimate the
total effect of civil war. Pesaran and Smith (2016) discuss this issue. We do not include
other covariates although the argument can be extended to allow for them.
4 Case studies
Consider an outcome such as per capita GDP, which has been observed before during
and after a conflict. We want to compare the observed outcome for the conflict years
with a hypothetical counterfactual, which gives the country’s per capita GDP in absence
of a conflict. To compare the trajectory of the GDP for a country affected by a civil
war with the trajectory of a control group, we need a suitable control unit with the same
characteristics of the unit exposed. Yet, when the units of analysis are aggregate entities,
like countries, a suitable single control often does not exist, and therefore a combination
of control units offers a better compromise.
As shown in section 3, the synthetic control method is based on the premise that
5We confine ourselves to static models to bring out the similarity between the panel and synthetic
control approaches, since the latter does not include lagged dependent variables of the treated cases.
6We exclude cases where the country was subject to interstate or extra-systemic wars.
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in the absence of a civil war, the evolution in terms of GDP per capita of the treated
region would be given by a weighted average of the potential comparison units that best
resemble the characteristics of the case of interest. The gap between the conflict-ridden
country and its artificial counterfactual and the cumulative stream of gaps can identify
the yearly effect as well as the cumulative effects of civil war on subsequent economic
performances over extended periods of time. To select the countries into the donor pool,
we focus only on the outcome variables in the pre-treatment period. Therefore the vectors
of pre-conflict characteristics for the country at war and the treated units include only
pre-treatment levels of per capita GDP.
We use civil war data from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset. Accordingly, a
civil war is defined as “a conflict between a government and a nongovernmental party”.
We use both cases where there is no interference from other countries and civil wars where
“the government side, the opposing side, or both sides, receive troop support from other
governments” since these instances are very frequent in contemporary internal conflict. We
exclude countries with extra-systemic armed conflicts - i.e., conflict between a state and
a non-state group outside its own territory, and interstate armed conflicts - i.e., between
two or more states. Real per capita GDP is taken from Penn World Table dataset.
Our pool of experiments is made up of countries meeting the following conditions: (i)
the treated country and the control group have no missing information on the outcome
variable in the 25-year-long sample period as we require 15-year pre-war observations to
calibrate the synthetic control and 10-year post-war observations to forecast the long-run
effect of the civil war; (ii) the treated country experienced a civil war at the latest in 2002,
as we focus on a 10-year post-war window;7 (iii) in case of multiple and subsequent civil
wars, we select the first one in chronological order. By imposing the above conditions, we
end up with 27 case studies.8
7With the exception of the Ivory Coast, where we only have 8 years post civil war onset.
8Following these criteria, we had to drop a number of very interesting cases, e.g., the 1997 civil war in
Eritrea because the GDP is only available from 1992 or the 1987 Lord’s Resistance Army insurgency in
Uganda, as there is not a sufficient number of pre-treatment observations without the presence of other
civil wars.
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The pool of potential comparison economies consists of countries which did not expe-
rience any civil war in the 25-year-long sample period (i.e., between 15 years before and
10 years after the onset of a civil war). As one valid concern in the context of this study is
the potential existence of spillover effects, we exclude from this pool the countries sharing
borders with the treated units.
Given the potential of heterogeneity across regions, we divide our 27 treated countries
into six groups i.e. Asia, Middle East and North Africa (MENA), Sub-saharan Africa,
Latin America and Europe.9 For the sake of brevity and to show the heterogenous effect
of civil war, this section will only briefly cover four case studies, one in the MENA region
(i.e., Algeria), one in Oceania (i.e., Papua New Guinea), one in Asia (i.e, Sri Lank), and
one in Sub-Saharan Africa (i.e., Uganda). We refer the reader to the online appendix for
the remaining countries.10
Figure 1 shows the real GDP per capita trends in levels for the treated country and
for its synthetic control. The estimated effect of a civil war on real per capita GDP is
the difference between per capita GDP (solid line) and in its synthetic version (dotted
line) after the onset of the civil war. As we can see, the real per capita GDP in the
synthetic very closely tracks the trajectory of this variable in the treated countries for
the entire 15-year pre-war period. This suggests that the synthetic provides a sensible
approximation to the GDP that would have been achieved in the treated country in the
post-war period in the absence of a war. A visual inspection of the discrepancies between
solid and dotted lines in the four cases suggests that civil war has no homogenous effects.
Algeria shows the case of a level shift, and a one-off temporary effect on the GDP. Uganda
displays a situation in which conflict causes the growth rate to deteriorate, and thus a
steady divergence from their artificial counterfactual following the onset of the civil war.
9Given its level of development and its aspiration to join the European Union, we have treated Turkey
as European.
10Section 1.1 in the appendix display the weights of each state in the synthetic control. For example,
the weights reported indicate that per capita GDP in Algeria prior to the civil war in 1991 is best
reproduced by a combination of the Bahamas (0.023), Albania (0.048), Iceland (0.023), Sao Tome and
Principe (0.155), Jordan (0.132), Oman (0.025), China (0.128), Mongolia (0.061), Bhutan (0.067), Brunei
Darussalam (0.008), Vanuatu (0.226) and Samoa (0.103).
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In Papua New Guinea the divergence between the solid and the dotted lines after the
outbreak of the conflict indicates that the country at war outperformed its synthetic
counterpart and that civil war had a positive impact on its subsequent GDP levels. In
Sri Lanka the treated countries and the synthetic control behave similarly in both the
pre-treatment period and the post-treatment period, showing virtually no divergence and
therefore no clear effect of civil war on economic growth (see Figure 1).
—————— [Figures 1 in here] ——————
The appendix contains the remaining cases. In particular, Figure A.1 includes Nepal
and Thailand. The Middle East and North Africa sample in Figures A.2 includes Egypt,
Morocco and Syria. Sub-saharan Africa is the region with the largest number of civil wars
in the post-WWII history and the question of why Africa has seen more wars has been
examined by a number of scholars.
Our sample of Sub-Saharan countries is very rich and includes Djibouti, Guinea,
Guinea Bissau, the Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mauritania, Niger, the Republic of Congo,
Mozambique, Rwanda, Senegal and Sierra Leone (Figures A.3 to A.5). Latin America
countries, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Peru, are in Figure A.6, while Europe (Figure A.7)
includes Spain, Turkey and the United Kingdom.11 Overall, the divergence between the
solid and the dotted lines after the outbreak of the conflict indicates that civil war pro-
duces very heterogeneous effects on the GDP, and these vary across countries and over
time.
To assess whether there is a significant difference between the outcomes of the treated,
yit, and the control group, y¯
S
it, during civil war years, we perform a Chow test to estimate
dih, the wartime forecast error in
11The start date of the treatment in Spain and the UK corresponds to heightened tensions between
the governments and the ETA and IRA, respectively, in terms of battle related deaths, as coded by the
PRIO/UPPSALA dataset. The results we obtain with the case study on Spain are consistent with early
findings by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003), who however measure the effects of ETA on the economy of
the Basque region only.
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yit − y¯Sit =
∑
h
dihcih + wit (4)
where cih are separate dummies for each of the war years,
h = T0i+1, T0i+2, ...., T0i+T1i .
The dih are the prediction errors for the war years, the wit will be the pre-intervention
differences between the treated case and the synthetic control and will be zero for the war
years, when the errors will be captured by dit.
Even if the mean of the errors was zero, βi = T
−1
1
∑
h
dih = 0, the variance may be
changed by the war, producing significant forecast errors. In fact, we estimate model 4
and assuming that the errors are normally distributed we test the restriction dih = 0.
This is the same null as a Chow predictive failure test. Table 1 displays the Chow test
for our four case studies, while Tables A1.-A.7 contain the Chow tests for the remaining
23 countries. In all Tables we also report the t-statistics and p-values for each war-time
dummies. For example we detect significant negative effects of the civil war on real per
capita GDP in Algeria and Uganda. These effects start materializing one year after the
onset of the conflict in Algeria and eight years after in Uganda. The positive effect on
Papua New Guinea’s economy is significant at convention level during the whole post-1992
period, whereas the difference between Sri Lanka GDP and its synthetic counterpart is
insignificant in most of the conflict years.
—————— [Table 1 in here] ——————
Table 2 summarizes the results from the case study analysis. The mean effect is the
coefficient of the civil war dummy (which takes on the value 1 when a country has a
conflict, and 0 otherwise) in an equation where the dependent variable is the log GDP
gap between the country at war and its artificial counterpart. In fact, we run an equation
similar to 4, but we do not use separate civil war year dummies, which allows us to obtain
a mean effect. We also report the p-value of this mean effect and the p-value of the Chow
18
test, which corresponds to the one displayed at the bottom of each panel containing the
individual Chow test. Finally, we report the Standard Error of the Regression (SER), to
show how well the pre-war model fits the data.
—————— [Table 2 in here] ——————
We find that 17 of the 27 cases show a negative effect of war on the GDP level, of
which 12, according to the Chow test, are statistically significant at conventional levels.
On the other hand, 4 out of 10 cases exhibit a positive and significant impact. In terms
of magnitude, Table 2 indicates that the average impact of conflict on the GDP level
is around -9.1%, even though this is imprecisely estimated (the standard deviation of
all βs is 0.19).12 This is different from the 17% drop found in the study of Costalli
et al. (2014), which uses a different sample (20 case studies), a different pre-intervention
period (10 years) and additional predictor variables to construct the synthetic control
(i.e., investment share, trade openness, population growth rate and secondary school
enrollment rate). However, considering common cases only, we obtain an average impact
of 12.8% against the 17.2% of Costalli et al. (2014).13
5 Panel data analysis
To link the results obtained from the synthetic control method to the panel data
analysis, we now estimate the economic costs of war using the empirical specification in
equation (3). In particular, we assume that the effects of conflict are homogenous over
time and across country. The model takes the following form
yit = βcit + ai + δ1c¯t + δ2y¯t + uit (5)
12Note that the countries at war omitted from the analysis show on average a larger per capita GDP than
the economies included in our study. Therefore, if we had also included these countries, the heterogeneity
in the estimated effects of conflict would have possibly been even more pronounced.
13Gardeazabal and Vega-Bayo (2015) use only pre-treatment values of the outcome variable and given
the similarity of the specification, they reach a finding similar to ours, i.e., the size of the effect of war is
very heterogeneous, although they do not report individual estimates, and only look at the GDP level,
thus making a direct comparison unfeasible.
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where yit is the (log) of real per capita GDP in a country i at time t.
Table 3 displays our estimates of equation (5). We use two balanced samples, one
over the full period 1960-2010 (models i to iii), in which however we need to drop three
countries, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Djibouti, as we do not have data for the first decade,
and the other over the period 1970-2010 (models iv to vi), which includes the full set
of countries. In order to compare the output gaps obtained from the synthetic control
method with a balanced panel data estimation, we use the same pool of control units
selected in the synthetic control method procedure (models i and iv). We also use a
restricted sample, with models (ii) and (v) estimating equation (5) only for the 27 case-
studies who experienced civil wars. Finally, in models (iii) and (vi) we run a mean group
(MG) estimator of Pesaran and Smith (1995), which produces consistent estimates of the
average of the individual country-specific parameters βi.
The models of Table 3 are semi-logarithmic regression, in which the dependent variable
is the natural logarithm of the real per capita GDP, therefore the interpretation of the
estimated coefficients of the control variable is that of a percentage change in per capita
GDP. The estimated impact of a civil war is never significant at conventional levels, with
the exception of model (iv), where it is around -6.4%. Although most of the coefficients
are not significantly different from zero, this should come as no surprise given the extreme
heterogeneity in countries’ reaction to conflict shocks. Recall that table 2, reporting the
country-specific effects estimated by means of the synthetic control, suggests that 10 of
out 27 countries exhibit a positive, rather than negative, average response to civil war.
—————— [Table 3 in here] ——————
Given that we use a large dataset from 1960 to 2011, and T = 51 is large, we can
estimate individual separate effects of civil war for each country and relax the homo-
geneity restrictions, while allowing for common factors influencing all countries and use
the Pesaran (2006) Correlated Common Effect, CCE, estimator. For the countries who
experienced civil wars we estimate the following model
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yit = β
c
i cit + a
c
i + δ
c
1ic¯t + δ
c
2iy¯t + uit
and then look at the distribution of the least squares estimator βˆci . We summarize the
results of this exercise in columns (iii) and (vi) of Table 3 by means of the Mean Group
estimator. As is made clear, the effect of war on the per capita GDP is insignificant at
conventional levels. Note that, although closely related, the panel data analysis and the
synthetic control methods are not expected to produce exactly the same estimates. Firstly,
we are allowing for c¯t, the correlated common effect estimator, in the panel data analysis,
to capture unobserved factors, which is however excluded in the synthetic. Secondly,
in the panel data analysis the comparator groups income is y¯t, while this is y¯
S
it in the
synthetic control method. In other words, the synthetic control method will only use a
restricted number of countries to construct the counterfactual for each treated unit.
Finally, in Figure 2 we present the distribution of the estimated coefficients of civil
war, βˆci , in the per capita GDP equation over the balanced sample 1 and 2 (Figure 2(a)
and 2(b) respectively). As we can see, again, there is a wide range of possible responses
to conflict shocks, ranging from -33% (Sierra-Leone) to +32% (Nicaragua and Egypt) in
the GDP level. This further reinforces the presence of a highly heterogeneous impact of
conflict on economic performances, which is variegated and it is often positive rather than
negative.
—————— [Figure 2 in here] ——————
6 Conclusions
The economic impact of conflict has been a very active area of academic debate in
recent years. Despite an extensive literature on this topic, the very direction of the
effect - whether it is negative, positive or null - and its size are still contentious. Wars
have heterogenous, country-specific effects on economic outcomes and there has been
considerable controversy in economics about the relative merits of qualitative case studies
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for particular countries and quantitative large-N studies for many countries. Case studies
can take account of a lot of country specific history but are a sample of one, often selected
for its salience which may make it unrepresentative of other cases. Large-N studies can
be generalized but ignore the country specific heterogeneity by, for instance, imposing
common coefficients.
This paper attempts to provide lower and upper estimates of the effect of civil war on
the level of economic activity by linking panel data analyses, case studies and synthetic
control methods, and by proposing a host of inferential methods. We first use a coun-
terfactual approach and compare the evolution of the real per capita GDP for countries
affected by a conflict with the evolution of an artificial control group. We find that in
many cases, civil wars did not have an obvious negative impact on the economic develop-
ment of exposed countries every year. On average, however, we find that civil war reduces
the GDP level by 9.1%, even though this is imprecisely estimated. We then compare
these results with a panel data analysis and find that the incidence of internal conflicts
has mostly insignificant effects on the GDP level. Yet, by relaxing the homogeneity re-
strictions, panel data also reveals a surprising wide array of positive and negative effects
of conflict on the economy of aﬄicted countries. Overall, both methods display a variety
of individual separate effects, and in a number of countries civil war has either no effect
or a positive and significant impact on the prospect for economic growth. Substantial
uncertainty on the effect of war on the economy remains, ensuring that the subject will
be a fertile area of study for the foreseeable future.
Supplementary material
Supplementary material (the Appendix and the data) is available online at the OUP
website.
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Figure 1: Per capita GDP trends, Treated Country vs. Synthetic Control
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Table 1: Chow test for case studies. Dependent variable is per capita GDP.
stat p-value
Algeria
1991 -0.891 0.388
1992 -5.945 0.000
1993 -17.771 0.000
1994 -22.455 0.000
1995 -25.587 0.000
1996 -26.403 0.000
1997 -26.286 0.000
1998 -21.584 0.000
1999 -18.265 0.000
2000 -26.070 0.000
2001 -24.277 0.000
F-test 308.428 0.000
Papua New Guinea
1989 -0.499 0.624
1990 -0.630 0.537
1992 2.430 0.026
1993 5.955 0.000
1994 5.977 0.000
1995 3.100 0.006
1996 3.647 0.002
F-test 12.826 0.000
Sri Lanka
1984 -1.490 0.158
1985 1.951 0.071
1986 1.238 0.236
1987 0.407 0.690
1988 -0.609 0.552
1989 1.407 0.181
1990 3.871 0.002
1991 2.346 0.034
1992 3.050 0.009
1993 1.662 0.119
1994 0.751 0.465
F-test 3.395 0.017
Uganda
1971 0.583 0.568
1972 0.095 0.926
1974 -0.692 0.499
1979 -2.612 0.020
1980 -2.474 0.026
1981 -2.592 0.020
F-test 3.152 0.033
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Table 2: Summary of results from case study analysis
Country Mean effect Mean effect
(p-value)
years Chow test
(p-value)
SER
Nepal -0.125 0.000 96-06 0.000 12.6
PapuaNewGuinea 0.164 0.000 89-90;92-96 0.000 121.1
Sri Lanka 0.025 0.043 84-94 0.017 32.2
Thailand 0.042 0.001 74-82 0.001 45
Algeria -0.106 0.000 91-01 0.000 26.6
Egypt -0.032 0.451 93-98 0.979 413.3
Morocco 0.024 0.421 71; 75-85 0.840 124.4
Syria 0.057 0.284 79-82 0.400 244.8
Djibouti -0.163 0.346 91-94; 99 0.836 1134.15
Guinea 0.058 0.514 00-01 0.807 111.1
Guinea-Bissau -0.100 0.500 98-99 0.820 190.7
Ivory Coast -0.011 0.844 02-04 0.914 133.5
Liberia 0.151 0.741 89-90 0.651 290.5
Mauritania 0.133 0.112 75-78 0.449 206.4
Mozambique -0.670 0.000 77-87 0.000 33
Niger 0.027 0.767 91-92;94-
95;97
0.921 125.5
Rep of Congo -0.010 0.800 93; 97-99; 02 0.662 186.5
Rwanda 0.007 0.900 90-94; 96-00 0.046 67.5
Senegal -0.180 0.005 90; 92-93;
95; 97-98; 00
0.002 155.5
Sierra leone -0.583 0.001 91-00 0.053 367.3
Uganda -0.300 0.017 71-72; 74;
79-81
0.033 176.3
El Salvador -0.260 0.000 79-89 0.000 78.6
Nicaragua -0.210 0.000 77-79; 82-87 0.000 284.8
Peru -0.194 0.000 82-92 0.000 51
Spain -0.108 0.002 78-82; 85-87 0.100 1350.6
Turkey -0.083 0.000 84-94 0.000 50
the UK -0.013 0.015 71-81 0.177 155
Mean of means -0.091
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Table 3: The impact of civil war (cit) on log per capita GDP (yit)
Balanced sample 1 Balanced sample 2
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
Log per capita GDP:
cit -0.065 -0.004 0.004 -0.064* -0.026 -0.012
(0.046) (0.047) (0.028) (0.037) (0.047) (0.030)
y¯t 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.021*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 0.974***
(0.129) (0.198) (0.195) (0.142) (0.329) (0.326)
c¯t 0.065 0.004 -0.031 0.064 0.026 -0.012
(0.287) (0.137) (0.137) (0.323) (0.224) (0.202)
RMSE 0.305 0.252 0.108 0.278 0.262 0.140
Countries 68 24 24 92 27 27
Observations (N×T) 3468 1224 1224 3772 1107 1107
NOTE. - Ordinary least squares estimates given. A constant is included in every model but not shown. Standard errors
in models (i)-(ii) and (iv)-(v) are clustered by country. Balanced sample 1 excludes Liberia, Sierra Leone and Djibouti
from the treated group and considers period 1960-2010. Balanced sample 2 considers period 1970-2010. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
31
0
1
2
3
4
-.2 -.1 0 .1 .2 .3
coefficient of civil war, per capita GDP equation
(a)
0
1
2
3
-.4 -.2 0 .2 .4
coefficient of civil war, per capita GDP equation
(b)
Figure 2: Distribution of the estimated coefficient of civil war (cit) of the per capita GDP
equation. Balanced sample 1 in (a), balanced sample 2 in (b).
